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ABSTRACT
It is well established by conflict theorists and others that successful
negotiation should incorporate “creating value” as well as “claim-
ing value.” Joint improvements that bring benefits to all parties
can be realised by (i) identifying attributes that are not of direct
conflict between the parties, (ii) tradeoffs on attributes that are val-
ued differently by different parties, and (iii) searching for values
within attributes that could bring more gains to one party while not
incurring too much loss on the other party. In this paper we pro-
pose an approach for maximising joint gains in automated nego-
tiations by formulating the negotiation problem as a multi-criteria
decision making problem and taking advantage of several optimi-
sation techniques introduced by operations researchers and conflict
theorists. We use a mediator to protect the negotiating parties from
unnecessary disclosure of information to their opponent, while also
allowing an objective calculation of maximum joint gains. We sep-
arate out attributes that take a finite set of values (simple attributes)
from those with continuous values, and we show that for simple
attributes, the mediator can determine the Pareto-optimal values.
In addition we show that if none of the simple attributes strongly
dominates the other simple attributes, then truth telling is an equi-
librium strategy for negotiators during the optimisation of simple
attributes. We also describe an approach for improving joint gains
on non-simple attributes, by moving the parties in a series of steps,
towards the Pareto-optimal frontier.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems;
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce
General Terms
Algorithms, Design
Keywords
automated negotiation, integrative negotiation, multi-criteria deci-
sion making
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1. INTRODUCTION
Given that negotiation is perhaps one of the oldest activities in
the history of human communication, it’s perhaps surprising that
conducted experiments on negotiations have shown that negotiators
more often than not reach inefficient compromises [1, 21]. Raiffa
[17] and Sebenius [20] provide analyses on the negotiators’ failure
to achieve efficient agreements in practice and their unwillingness
to disclose private information due to strategic reasons. According
to conflict theorists Lax and Sebenius [13], most negotiation ac-
tually involves both integrative and distributive bargaining which
they refer to as ”creating value” and ”claiming value.” They argue
that negotiation necessarily includes both cooperative and compet-
itive elements, and that these elements exist in tension. Negotiators
face a dilemma in deciding whether to pursue a cooperative or a
competitive strategy at a particular time during a negotiation. They
refer to this problem as the Negotiator’s Dilemma.
We argue that the Negotiator’s Dilemma is essentially information-
based, due to the private information held by the agents. Such
private information contains both the information that implies the
agent’s bottom lines (or, her walk-away positions) and the infor-
mation that enforces her bargaining strength. For instance, when
bargaining to sell a house to a potential buyer, the seller would
try to hide her actual reserve price as much as possible for she
hopes to reach an agreement at a much higher price than her re-
serve price. On the other hand, the outside options available to her
(e.g. other buyers who have expressed genuine interest with fairly
good offers) consist in the information that improves her bargain-
ing strength about which she would like to convey to her opponent.
But at the same time, her opponent is well aware of the fact that it
is her incentive to boost her bargaining strength and thus will not
accept every information she sends out unless it is substantiated by
evidence.
Coming back to the Negotiator’s Dilemma, it’s not always possi-
ble to separate the integrative bargaining process from the distribu-
tive bargaining process. In fact, more often than not, the two pro-
cesses interplay with each other making information manipulation
become part of the integrative bargaining process. This is because a
negotiator could use the information about his opponent’s interests
against her during the distributive negotiation process. That is, a
negotiator may refuse to concede on an important conflicting issue
by claiming that he has made a major concession (on another is-
sue) to meet his opponent’s interests even though the concession he
made could be insignificant to him. For instance, few buyers would
start a bargaining with a dealer over a deal for a notebook computer
by declaring that he is most interested in an extended warranty for
the item and therefore prepared to pay a high price to get such an
extended warranty.
Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs) and negotiating software
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agents (NSAs) have been introduced either to assist humans in
making decisions or to enable automated negotiation to allow com-
puter processes to engage in meaningful negotiation to reach agree-
ments (see, for instance, [14, 15, 19, 6, 5]). However, because of
the Negotiator’s Dilemma and given even bargaining power and
incomplete information, the following two undesirable situations
often arise: (i) negotiators reach inefficient compromises, or (ii)
negotiators engage in a deadlock situation in which both negotia-
tors refuse to act upon with incomplete information and at the same
time do not want to disclose more information.
In this paper, we argue for the role of a mediator to resolve the
above two issues. The mediator thus plays two roles in a negotia-
tion: (i) to encourage cooperative behaviour among the negotiators,
and (ii) to absorb the information disclosure by the negotiators to
prevent negotiators from using uncertainty and private information
as a strategic device. To take advantage of existing results in ne-
gotiation analysis and operations research (OR) literatures [18], we
employ multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) theory to allow
the negotiation problem to be represented and analysed. Section 2
provides background on MCDM theory and the negotiation frame-
work. Section 3 formulates the problem. In Section 4, we discuss
our approach to integrative negotiation. Section 5 discusses the fu-
ture work with some concluding remarks.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Multi-criteria decision making theory
Let A denote the set of feasible alternatives available to a deci-
sion maker M . As an act, or decision, a in A may involve mul-
tiple aspects, we usually describe the alternatives a with a set of
attributes j; (j = 1, . . . ,m). (Attributes are also referred to as is-
sues, or decision variables.) A typical decision maker also has sev-
eral objectives X1, . . . ,Xk . We assume that Xi, (i = 1, . . . , k),
maps the alternatives to real numbers. Thus, a tuple (x1, . . . , xk) =
(X1(a), . . . ,Xk(a)) denotes the consequence of the act a to the
decision maker M . By definition, objectives are statements that
delineate the desires of a decision maker. Thus, M wishes to max-
imise his objectives. However, as discussed thoroughly by Keeney
and Raiffa [8], it is quite likely that a decision maker’s objectives
will conflict with each other in that the improved achievement with
one objective can only be accomplished at the expense of another.
For instance, most businesses and public services have objectives
like “minimise cost” and “maximise the quality of services.” Since
better services can often only be attained for a price, these objec-
tives conflict.
Due to the conflicting nature of a decision maker’s objectives, M
usually has to settle at a compromise solution. That is, he may have
to choose an act a ∈ A that does not optimise every objective. This
is the topic of the multi-criteria decision making theory. Part of the
solution to this problem is that M has to try to identify the Pareto
frontier in the consequence space {(X1(a), . . . ,Xk(a))}a∈A.
DEFINITION 1. (Dominant)
Let x = (x1, . . . , xk) and x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′k) be two conse-
quences. x dominates x′ iff xi > x′i for all i, and the inequality is
strict for at least one i.
The Pareto frontier in a consequence space then consists of all
consequences that are not dominated by any other consequence.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1 in which an alternative consists of two
attributes d1 and d2 and the decision maker tries to maximise the
two objectives X1 and X2. A decision a ∈ A whose consequence
does not lie on the Pareto frontier is inefficient. While the Pareto
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Figure 1: The Pareto frontier
frontier allows M to avoid taking inefficient decisions, M still has
to decide which of the efficient consequences on the Pareto frontier
is most preferred by him.
MCDM theorists introduce a mechanism to allow the objective
components of consequences to be normalised to the payoff valua-
tions for the objectives. Consequences can then be ordered: if the
gains in satisfaction brought about by C1 (in comparison to C2)
equals to the losses in satisfaction brought about by C1 (in compar-
ison to C2), then the two consequences C1 and C2 are considered
indifferent. M can now construct the set of indifference curves1 in
the consequence space (the dashed curves in Fig. 1). The most pre-
ferred indifference curve that intersects with the Pareto frontier is
in focus: its intersection with the Pareto frontier is the sought after
consequence (i.e., the optimal consequence in Fig. 1).
2.2 A negotiation framework
A multi-agent negotiation framework consists of:
1. A set of two negotiating agents N = {1, 2}.
2. A set of attributes Att = {α1, . . . , αm} characterising the is-
sues the agents are negotiating over. Each attribute α can take a
value from the set V alα;
3. A set of alternative outcomes O. An outcome o ∈ O is repre-
sented by an assignment of values to the corresponding attributes
in Att.
4. Agents’ utility: Based on the theory of multiple-criteria decision
making [8], we define the agents’ utility as follows:
• Objectives: Agent i has a set of ni objectives, or interests;
denoted by j (j = 1, . . . , ni). To measure how much an out-
come o fulfills an objective j to an agent i, we use objective
functions: for each agent i, we define i’s interests using the
objective vector function fi = [fij ] : O → Rni .
• Value functions: Instead of directly evaluating an outcome o,
agent i looks at how much his objectives are fulfilled and will
make a valuation based on these more basic criteria. Thus,
for each agent i, there is a value function σi : Rni → R.
In particular, Raiffa [17] shows how to systematically con-
struct an additive value function to each party involved in a
negotiation.
• Utility: Now, given an outcome o ∈ O, an agent i is able
to determine its value, i.e., σi(fi(o)). However, a negotia-
tion infrastructure is usually required to facilitate negotiation.
This might involve other mechanisms and factors/parties, e.g.,
a mediator, a legal institution, participation fees, etc. The
standard way to implement such a thing is to allow money
1In fact, given the k-dimensional space, these should be called in-
difference surfaces. However, we will not bog down to that level of
details.
The Sixth Intl. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 07) 509
and side-payments. In this paper, we ignore those side-effects
and assume that agent i’s utility function ui is normalised so
that ui : O → [0, 1].
EXAMPLE 1. There are two agents, A and B. Agent A has
a task T that needs to be done and also 100 units of a resource
R. Agent B has the capacity to perform task T and would like to
obtain at least 10 and at most 20 units of the resource R. Agent B is
indifferent on any amount between 10 and 20 units of the resource
R. The objective functions for both agents A and B are cost and
revenue. And they both aim at minimising costs while maximising
revenues. Having T done generates for A a revenue rA,T while
doing T incurs a cost cB,T to B. Agent B obtains a revenue rB,R
for each unit of the resource R while providing each unit of the
resource R costs agent A cA,R.
Assuming that money transfer between agents is possible, the set
Att then contains three attributes:
• T , taking values from the set {0, 1}, indicates whether the
task T is assigned to agent B;
• R, taking values from the set of non-negative integer, indi-
cates the amount of resource R being allocated to agent B;
and
• MT , taking values from R, indicates the payment p to be
transferred from A to B.
Consider the outcome o = [T = 1, R = k,MT = p], i.e., the
task T is assigned to B, and A allocates to B with k units of the
resource R, and A transfers p dollars to B. Then, costA(o) =
k.cA,R + p and revA(o) = rA,T ; and costB(o) = cB,T and
revA(o) =
j
k.rB,R + p if 10 ≤ k ≤ 20
p otherwise.
And, σi(costi(o), revi(o)) = revi(o)− costi(o), (i = A,B).
3. PROBLEM FORMALISATION
Consider Example 1, assume that rA,T = $150 and cB,T =
$100 and rB,R = $10 and cA,R = $7. That is, the revenues gen-
erated for A exceeds the costs incurred to B to do task T , and B
values resource R more highly than the cost for A to provide it.
The optimal solution to this problem scenario is to assign task T to
agent B and to allocate 20 units of resource R (i.e., the maximal
amount of resource R required by agent B) from agent A to agent
B. This outcome regarding the resource and task allocation prob-
lems leaves payoffs of $10 to agent A and $100 to agent B.2 Any
other outcome would leave at least one of the agents worse off. In
other words, the presented outcome is Pareto-efficient and should
be part of the solution outcome for this problem scenario.
However, as the agents still have to bargain over the amount of
money transfer p, neither agent would be willing to disclose their
respective costs and revenues regarding the task T and the resource
R. As a consequence, agents often do not achieve the optimal out-
come presented above in practice. To address this issue, we intro-
duce a mediator to help the agents discover better agreements than
the ones they might try to settle on. Note that this problem is es-
sentially the problem of searching for joint gains in a multilateral
negotiation in which the involved parties hold strategic information,
i.e., the integrative part in a negotiation. In order to help facilitate
this process, we introduce the role of a neutral mediator. Before
formalising the decision problems faced by the mediator and the
2Certainly, without money transfer to compensate agent A, this
outcome is not a fair one.
negotiating agents, we discuss the properties of the solution out-
comes to be achieved by the mediator. In a negotiation setting, the
two typical design goals would be:
• Efficiency: Avoid the agents from settling on an outcome that
is not Pareto-optimal; and
• Fairness: Avoid agreements that give the most of the gains
to a subset of agents while leaving the rest with too little.
The above goals are axiomatised in Nash’s seminal work [16] on
cooperative negotiation games. Essentially, Nash advocates for the
following properties to be satisfied by solution to the bilateral nego-
tiation problem: (i) it produces only Pareto-optimal outcomes; (ii)
it is invariant to affine transformation (to the consequence space);
(iii) it is symmetric; and (iv) it is independent from irrelevant al-
ternatives. A solution satisfying Nash’s axioms is called a Nash
bargaining solution.
It then turns out that, by taking the negotiators’ utilities as its
objectives the mediator itself faces a multi-criteria decision making
problem. The issues faced by the mediator are: (i) the mediator
requires access to the negotiators’ utility functions, and (ii) mak-
ing (fair) tradeoffs between different agents’ utilities. Our methods
allow the agents to repeatedly interact with the mediator so that a
Nash solution outcome could be found by the parties.
Informally, the problem faced by both the mediator and the ne-
gotiators is construction of the indifference curves. Why are the
indifference curves so important?
• To the negotiators, knowing the options available along in-
difference curves opens up opportunities to reach more ef-
ficient outcomes. For instance, consider an agent A who is
presenting his opponent with an offer θA which she refuses
to accept. Rather than having to concede, A could look at
his indifference curve going through θA and choose another
proposal θ′A. To him, θA and θ′A are indifferent but θ′A could
give some gains to B and thus will be more acceptable to B.
In other words, the outcome θ′A is more efficient than θA to
these two negotiators.
• To the mediator, constructing indifference curves requires a
measure of fairness between the negotiators. The mediator
needs to determine how much utility it needs to take away
from the other negotiators to give a particular negotiator a
specific gain G (in utility).
In order to search for integrative solutions within the outcome
space O, we characterise the relationship between the agents over
the set of attributes Att. As the agents hold different objectives and
have different capacities, it may be the case that changing between
two values of a specific attribute implies different shifts in utility
of the agents. However, the problem of finding the exact Pareto-
optimal set3 is NP-hard [2].
Our approach is thus to solve this optimisation problem in two
steps. In the first steps, the more manageable attributes will be
solved. These are attributes that take a finite set of values. The
result of this step would be a subset of outcomes that contains the
Pareto-optimal set. In the second step, we employ an iterative pro-
cedure that allows the mediator to interact with the negotiators to
find joint improvements that move towards a Pareto-optimal out-
come. This approach will not work unless the attributes from Att
3The Pareto-optimal set is the set of outcomes whose consequences
(in the consequence space) correspond to the Pareto frontier.
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are independent. Most works on multi-attribute, or multi-issue, ne-
gotiation (e.g. [17]) assume that the attributes or the issues are in-
dependent, resulting in an additive value function for each agent.4
ASSUMPTION 1. Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ Att. Denote by S¯ the
set Att \ S. Assume that vS and v′S are two assignments of values
to the attributes of S and v1S¯ , v2S¯ are two arbitrary value assign-
ments to the attributes of S¯, then (ui([vS , v1S¯ ]) − ui([v′S , v2S¯ ])) =
(ui([vS , v
1
S¯ ])−ui([v
′
S , v
2
S¯])). That is, the utility function of agent i
will be defined on the attributes from S independently of any value
assignment to other attributes.
4. MEDIATOR-BASEDBILATERALNEGO-
TIATIONS
As discussed by Lax and Sebenius [13], under incomplete in-
formation the tension between creating and claiming values is the
primary cause of inefficient outcomes. This can be seen most eas-
ily in negotiations involving two negotiators; during the distribu-
tive phase of the negotiation, the two negotiators’s objectives are
directly opposing each other. We will now formally characterise
this relationship between negotiators by defining the opposition be-
tween two negotiating parties. The following exposition will be
mainly reproduced from [9].
Assuming for the moment that all attributes from Att take values
from the set of real numbers R, i.e., V alj ⊆ R for all j ∈ Att. We
further assume that the set O = ×j∈AttV alj of feasible outcomes
is defined by constraints that all parties must obey andO is convex.
Now, an outcome o ∈ O is just a point in the m-dimensional space
of real numbers. Then, the questions are: (i) from the point of view
of an agent i, is o already the best outcome for i? (ii) if o is not
the best outcome for i then is there another outcome o′ such that o′
gives i a better utility than o and o′ does not cause a utility loss to
the other agent j in comparison to o?
The above questions can be answered by looking at the directions
of improvement of the negotiating parties at o, i.e., the directions
in the outcome space O into which their utilities increase at point
o. Under the assumption that the parties’ utility functions ui are
differentiable concave, the set of all directions of improvement for
a party at a point o can be defined in terms of his most preferred,
or gradient, direction at that point. When the gradient direction
∇ui(o) of agent i at point o is outright opposing to the gradient
direction∇uj(o) of agent j at point o then the two parties strongly
disagree at o and no joint improvements can be achieved for i and
j in the locality surrounding o.
Since opposition between the two parties can vary considerably
over the outcome space (with one pair of outcomes considered
highly antagonistic and another pair being highly cooperative), we
need to describe the local properties of the relationship. We begin
with the opposition at any point of the outcome space Rm. The
following definition is reproduced from [9]:
DEFINITION 2. 1. The parties are in local strict opposition
at a point x ∈ Rm iff for all points x′ ∈ Rm that are suffi-
ciently close to x (i.e., for some  > 0 such that
∀x′ ‖ x′−x ‖< ), an increase of one utility can be achieved
only at the expense of a decrease of the other utility.
2. The parties are in local non-strict opposition at a point x ∈
R
m iff they are not in local strict opposition at x, i.e., iff it is
possible for both parties to raise their utilities by moving an
infinitesimal distance from x.
4Klein et al. [10] explore several implications of complex contracts
in which attributes are possibly inter-dependent.
3. The parties are in local weak opposition at a point x ∈ Rm
iff∇u1(x).∇u2(x) ≥ 0, i.e., iff the gradients at x of the two
utility functions form an acute or right angle.
4. The parties are in local strong opposition at a point x ∈ Rm
iff ∇u1(x).∇u2(x) < 0, i.e., iff the gradients at x form an
obtuse angle.
5. The parties are in global strict (nonstrict, weak, strong) op-
position iff for every x ∈ Rm they are in local strict (non-
strict, weak, strong) opposition.
Global strict and nonstrict oppositions are complementary cases.
Essentially, under global strict opposition the whole outcome space
O becomes the Pareto-optimal set as at no point in O can the ne-
gotiating parties make a joint improvement, i.e., every point in O
is a Pareto-efficient outcome. In other words, under global strict
opposition the outcome space O can be flattened out into a single
line such that for each pair of outcomes x,y ∈ O, u1(x) < u1(y)
iff u2(x) > u2(y), i.e., at every point inO, the gradient of the two
utility functions point to two different ends of the line.
Intuitively, global strict opposition implies that there is no way to
obtain joint improvements for both agents. As a consequence, the
negotiation degenerates to a distributive negotiation, i.e., the nego-
tiating parties should try to claim as much shares from the negoti-
ation issues as possible while the mediator should aim for the fair-
ness of the division. On the other hand, global nonstrict opposition
allows room for joint improvements and all parties might be better
off trying to realise the potential gains by reaching Pareto-efficient
agreements. Weak and strong oppositions indicate different levels
of opposition. The weaker the opposition, the more potential gains
can be realised making cooperation the better strategy to employ
during negotiation. On the other hand, stronger opposition sug-
gests that the negotiating parties tend to behave strategically lead-
ing to misrepresentation of their respective objectives and utility
functions and making joint gains more difficult to realise.
We have been temporarily making the assumption that the out-
come space O is the subset of Rm. In many real-world negotia-
tions, this assumption would be too restrictive. We will continue
our exposition by lifting this restriction and allowing discrete at-
tributes. However, as most negotiations involve only discrete is-
sues with a bounded number of options, we will assume that each
attribute takes values either from a finite set or from the set of real
numbersR. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to attributes whose
values are from finite sets as simple attributes and attributes whose
values are from R as continuous attributes. The notions of local
oppositions, i.e., strict, nonstrict, weak and strong, are not applica-
ble to outcome spaces that contain simple attributes and nor are the
notions of global weak and strong oppositions. However, the no-
tions of global strict and nonstrict oppositions can be generalised
for outcome spaces that contain simple attributes.
DEFINITION 3. Given an outcome space O, the parties are in
global strict opposition iff ∀x,y ∈ O, u1(x) < u1(y) iff u2(x) >
u2(y).
The parties are in global nonstrict opposition if they are not in
global strict opposition.
4.1 Optimisation on simple attributes
In order to extract the optimal values for a subset of attributes,
in the first step of this optimisation process the mediator requests
the negotiators to submit their respective utility functions over the
set of simple attributes. Let Simp ⊆ Att denote the set of all sim-
ple attributes from Att. Note that, due to Assumption 1, agent i’s
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utility function can be characterised as follows:
ui([vSimp,vSimp]) = w
i
1 ∗ ui,1([vSimp]) + w
i
2 ∗ ui,2([vSimp]),
where Simp = Att \ Simp, and ui,1 and ui,2 are the utility compo-
nents of ui over the sets of attributes Simp and Simp, respectively,
and 0 < wi1, wi2 < 1 and wi1 + wi2 = 1.
As attributes are independent of each other regarding the agents’
utility functions, the optimisation problem over the attributes from
Simp can be carried out by fixing ui([vSimp]) to a constant C,
and then search for the optimal values within the set of attributes
Simp. Now, how does the mediator determine the optimal values
for the attributes in Simp? Several well-known optimisation strate-
gies could be applicable here:
• The utilitarian solution: The sum of the agents’ utilities are
maximised. Thus, the optimal values are the solution of the
following optimisation problem:
arg max
v∈V alSimp
X
i∈N
ui(v)
• The Nash solution: The product of the agents’ utilities are
maximised. Thus, the optimal values are the solution of the
following optimisation problem:
arg max
v∈V alSimp
Y
i∈N
ui(v)
• The egalitarian solution (aka. the maximin solution): The
utility of the agent with minimum utility is maximised. Thus,
the optimal values are the solution of the following optimi-
sation problem:
arg max
v∈V alSimp
min
i∈N
ui(v)
The question now is of course whether a negotiator has the incen-
tive to misrepresent his utility function. First of all, recall that the
agents’ utility functions are bounded, i.e., ∀o ∈ O.0 ≤ ui(o) ≤ 1.
Thus, the agents have no incentive to overstate their utility regard-
ing an outcome o: If o is the most preferred outcome to an agent
i then he already assigns the maximal utility to o. On the other
hand, if o is not the most preferred outcome to i then by overstat-
ing the utility he assigns to o, the agent i runs the risk of having
to settle on an agreement which would give him less payoffs than
he is supposed to receive. However, agents do have an incentive
to understate their utility if the final settlement will be based on the
above solutions alone. Essentially, the mechanism to avoid an agent
to understate his utility regarding particular outcomes is to guaran-
tee a certain measure of fairness for the final settlement. That is,
the agents lose the incentive to be dishonest to obtain gains from
taking advantage of the known solutions to determine the settle-
ment outcome for they would be offset by the fairness maintenance
mechanism. Firsts, we state an easy lemma.
LEMMA 1. When Simp contains one single attributes, the agents
have the incentive to understate their utility functions regarding
outcomes that are not attractive to them.
By way of illustration, consider the set Simp containing only one
attribute that could take values from the finite set {A,B,C,D}.
Assume that negotiator 1 assigns utilities of 0.4, 0.7, 0.9, and 1
to A,B,C, and D, respectively. Assume also that negotiator 2
assigns utilities of 1, 0.9, 0.7, and 0.4 to A,B,C, and D, respec-
tively. If agent 1 misrepresents his utility function to the mediator
by reporting utility 0 for all values A,B and C and utility 1 for
value D then the agent 2 who plays honestly in his report to the
mediator will obtain the worst outcome D given any of the above
solutions. Note that agent 1 doesn’t need to know agent 2’s utility
function, nor does he need to know the strategy employed by agent
2. As long as he knows that the mediator is going to employ one of
the above three solutions, then the above misrepresentation is the
dominant strategy for this game.
However, when the set Simp contains more than one attribute
and none of the attributes strongly dominate the other attributes
then the above problem disminishes by itself thanks to the integra-
tive solution. We of course have to define clearly what it means
for an attribute to strongly dominate other attributes. Intuitively, if
most of an agent’s utility concentrates on one of the attributes then
this attribute strongly dominates other attributes. We again appeal
to the Assumption 1 on additivity of utility functions to achieve a
measure of fairness within this negotiation setting. Due to Assump-
tion 1, we can characterise agent i’s utility component over the set
of attributes Simp by the following equation:
ui,1([vSimp]) =
X
j∈Simp
w
i
j ∗ ui,j([vj ]) (1)
where
P
j∈Simp wj = 1.
Then, an attribute  ∈ Simp strongly dominates the rest of the
attributes in Simp (for agent i) iff wi >
P
j∈(Simp−) w
i
j . Attribute
 is said to be strongly dominant (for agent i) wrt. the set of simple
attributes Simp.
The following theorem shows that if the set of attributes Simp
does not contain a strongly dominant attribute then the negotiators
have no incentive to be dishonest.
THEOREM 1. Given a negotiation framework, if for every agent
the set of simple attributes doesn’t contain a strongly dominant at-
tribute, then truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy for the negotia-
tors during the optimisation of simple attributes.
So far, we have been concentrating on the efficiency issue while
leaving the fairness issue aside. A fair framework does not only
support a more satisfactory distribution of utility among the agents,
but also often a good measure to prevent misrepresentation of pri-
vate information by the agents. Of the three solutions presented
above, the utilitarian solution does not support fairness. On the
other hand, Nash [16] proves that the Nash solution satisfies the
above four axioms for the cooperative bargaining games and is con-
sidered a fair solution. The egalitarian solution is another mecha-
nism to achieve fairness by essentially helping the worst off. The
problem with these solutions, as discussed earlier, is that they are
vulnerable to strategic behaviours when one of the attributes strongly
dominates the rest of attributes.
However, there is yet another solution that aims to guarantee fair-
ness, the minimax solution. That is, the utility of the agent with
maximum utility is minimised. It’s obvious that the minimax so-
lution produces inefficient outcomes. However, to get around this
problem (given that the Pareto-optimal set can be tractably com-
puted), we can apply this solution over the Pareto-optimal set only.
Let POSet ⊆ V alSimp be the Pareto-optimal subset of the simple
outcomes, the minimax solution is defined to be the solution of the
following optimisation problem.
arg min
v∈POSet
max
i∈N
ui(v)
While overall efficiency often suffers under a minimax solution,
i.e., the sum of all agents’ utilities are often lower than under other
solutions, it can be shown that the minimax solution is less vulner-
able to manipulation.
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THEOREM 2. Given a negotiation framework, under the min-
imax solution, if the negotiators are uncertain about their oppo-
nents’ preferences then truth-telling is an equilibrium strategy for
the negotiators during the optimisation of simple attributes.
That is, even when there is only one single simple attribute, if an
agent is uncertain whether the other agent’s most preferred resolu-
tion is also his own most preferred resolution then he should opt for
truth-telling as the optimal strategy.
4.2 Optimisation on continuous attributes
When the attributes take values from infinite sets, we assume that
they are continuous. This is similar to the common practice in oper-
ations research in which linear programming solutions/techniques
are applied to integer programming problems.
We denote the number of continuous attributes by k, i.e., Att =
Simp ∪ Simp and |Simp| = k. Then, the outcome space O can be
represented as follows: O = (
Q
j∈Simp V alj) × (
Q
l∈Simp V all),
where
Q
l∈Simp V all ⊆ R
k is the continuous component of O. Let
Oc denote the set
Q
l∈Simp V all. We’ll refer to O
c as the feasible
set and assume that Oc is closed and convex. After carrying out
the optimisation over the set of simple attributes, we are able to as-
sign the optimal values to the simple attributes from Simp. Thus,
we reduce the original problem to the problem of searching for op-
timal (and fair) outcomes within the feasible set Oc. Recall that,
by Assumption 1, we can characterise agent i’s utility function as
follows:
ui([v
∗
Simp,vSimp]) = C + w
i
2 ∗ ui,2([vSimp]),
where C is the constant wi1 ∗ ui,1([v∗Simp]) and v
∗
Simp denotes the
optimal values of the simple attributes in Simp. Hence, without loss
of generality (albeit with a blatant abuse of notation), we can take
the agent i’s utility function as ui : Rk → [0, 1]. Accordingly we
will also take the set of outcomes under consideration by the agents
to be the feasible set Oc. We now state another assumption to be
used in this section:
ASSUMPTION 2. The negotiators’ utility functions can be de-
scribed by continuously differentiable and concave functions ui :
R
k → [0, 1], (i = 1, 2).
It should be emphasised that we do not assume that agents ex-
plicitly know their utility functions. For the method to be described
in the following to work, we only assume that the agents know the
relevant information, e.g. at certain point within the feasible setOc,
the gradient direction of their own utility functions and some sec-
tion of their respective indifference curves. Assume that a tentative
agreement (which is a point x ∈ Rk) is currently on the table, the
process for the agents to jointly improve this agreement in order to
reach a Pareto-optimal agreement can be described as follows. The
mediator asks the negotiators to discretely submit their respective
gradient directions at x, i.e.,∇u1(x) and ∇u2(x).
Note that the goal of the process to be described here is to search
for agreements that are more efficient than the tentative agreement
currently on the table. That is, we are searching for points x′ within
the feasible setOc such that moving to x′ from the current tentative
agreement x brings more gains to at least one of the agents while
not hurting any of the agents. Due to the assumption made above,
i.e. the feasible set Oc is bounded, the conditions for an alternative
x ∈ Oc to be efficient vary depending on the position of x. The
following results are proved in [9]:
Let B(x) = 0 denote the equation of the boundary ofOc, defin-
ing x ∈ Oc iff B(x) ≥ 0. An alternative x∗ ∈ Oc is efficient iff,
either
A. x∗ is in the interior of Oc and the parties are in local strict op-
position at x∗, i.e.,
∇u1(x
∗) = −γ∇u2(x
∗) (2)
where γ > 0; or
B. x∗ is on the boundary of Oc, and for some α, β ≥ 0:
α∇u1(x
∗) + β∇u2(x
∗) = ∇B(x∗) (3)
We are now interested in answering the following questions:
(i) What is the initial tentative agreement x0?
(ii) How to find the more efficient agreement xh+1, given the
current tentative agreement xh?
4.2.1 Determining a fair initial tentative agreement
It should be emphasised that the choice of the initial tentative
agreement affects the fairness of the final agreement to be reached
by the presented method. For instance, if the initial tentative agree-
ment x0 is chosen to be the most preferred alternative to one of
the agents then it is also a Pareto-optimal outcome, making it im-
possible to find any joint improvement from x0. However, if x0
will then be chosen to be the final settlement and if x0 turns out
to be the worst alternative to the other agent then this outcome is a
very unfair one. Thus, it’s important that the choice of the initial
tentative agreement be sensibly made.
Ehtamo et al [3] present several methods to choose the initial ten-
tative agreement (called reference point in their paper). However,
their goal is to approximate the Pareto-optimal set by systemati-
cally choosing a set of reference points. Once an (approximate)
Pareto-optimal set is generated, it is left to the negotiators to decide
which of the generated Pareto-optimal outcomes to be chosen as
the final settlement. That is, distributive negotiation will then be
required to settle the issue.
We, on the other hand, are interested in a fair initial tentative
agreement which is not necessarily efficient. Improving a given
tentative agreement to yield a Pareto-optimal agreement is consid-
ered in the next section. For each attribute j ∈ Simp, an agent i will
be asked to discretely submit three values (from the set V alj): the
most preferred value, denoted by pvi,j , the least preferred value,
denoted by wvi,j , and a value that gives i an approximately av-
erage payoff, denoted by avi,j . (Note that this is possible be-
cause the set V alj is bounded.) If pv1,j and pv2,j are sufficiently
close, i.e., |pv1,j − pv2,j | < Δ for some pre-defined Δ > 0,
then pv1,j and pv2,j are chosen to be the two “core” values, de-
noted by cv1 and cv2. Otherwise, between the two values pv1,j
and av1,j , we eliminate the one that is closer to wv2,j , the remain-
ing value is denoted by cv1. Similarly, we obtain cv2 from the
two values pv2,j and av2,j . If cv1 = cv2 then cv1 is selected as
the initial value for the attribute j as part of the initial tentative
agreement. Otherwise, without loss of generality, we assume that
cv1 < cv2. The mediator selects randomly p values mv1, . . . , mvp
from the open interval (cv1, cv2), where p ≥ 1. The mediator then
asks the agents to submit their valuations over the set of values
{cv1, cv2,mv1, . . . ,mvp}. The value whose the two valuations of
two agents are closest is selected as the initial value for the attribute
j as part of the initial tentative agreement.
The above procedure guarantees that the agents do not gain by
behaving strategically. By performing the above procedure on ev-
ery attribute j ∈ Simp, we are able to identify the initial tentative
agreement x0 such that x0 ∈ Oc. The next step is to compute
a new tentative agreement from an existing tentative agreement so
that the new one would be more efficient than the existing one.
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4.2.2 Computing new tentative agreement
Our procedure is a combination of the method of jointly improv-
ing direction introduced by Ehtamo et al [4] and a method we pro-
pose in the coming section. Basically, the idea is to see how strong
the opposition the parties are in. If the two parties are in (local)
weak opposition at the current tentative agreement xh, i.e., their
improving directions at xh are close to each other, then the com-
promise direction proposed by Ehtamo et al [4] is likely to point to
a better agreement for both agents. However, if the two parties are
in local strong opposition at the current point xh then it’s unclear
whether the compromise direction would really not hurt one of the
agents whilst bringing some benefit to the other.
We will first review the method proposed by Ehtamo et al [4]
to compute the compromise direction for a group of negotiators at
a given point x ∈ Oc. Ehtamo et al define a a function T (x)
that describes the mediator’s choice for a compromise direction at
x. For the case of two-party negotiations, the following bisecting
function, denoted by T BS, can be defined over the interior set ofOc.
Note that the closed set Oc contains two disjoint subsets: Oc =
Oc0∪O
c
B , whereOc0 denotes the set of interior points ofOc andOcB
denotes the boundary of Oc. The bisecting compromise is defined
by a function T BS : Oc0 → R2,
T BS(x) =
∇u1(x)
‖ ∇u1(x) ‖
+
∇u2(x)
‖ ∇u2(x) ‖
, x ∈ Oc0. (4)
Given the current tentative agreement xh (h ≥ 0), the mediator
has to choose a point xh+1 along d = T (xh) so that all parties
gain. Ehtamo et al then define a mechanism to generate a sequence
of points and prove that when the generated sequence is bounded
and when all generated points (from the sequence) belong to the
interior set Oc0 then the sequence converges to a weakly Pareto-
optimal agreement [4, pp. 59–60].5
As the above mechanism does not work at the boundary points
of Oc, we will introduce a procedure that works everywhere in an
alternative space Oc. Let x ∈ Oc and let θ(x) denote the angle
between the gradients ∇u1(x) and ∇u2(x) at x. That is,
θ(x) = arccos(
∇u1(x).∇u2(x)
‖ ∇u1(x) ‖ . ‖ ∇u2(x) ‖
)
From Definition 2, it is obvious that the two parties are in local
strict opposition (at x) iff θ(x) = π, and they are in local strong
opposition iff π ≥ θ(x) > π/2, and they are in local weak oppo-
sition iff π/2 ≥ θ(x) ≥ 0. Note also that the two vectors ∇u1(x)
and ∇u2(x) define a hyperplane, denoted by h∇(x), in the k-
dimensional space Rk. Furthermore, there are two indifference
curves of agents 1 and 2 going through point x, denoted by IC1(x)
and IC2(x), respectively. Let hT1(x) and hT2(x) denote the tan-
gent hyperplanes to the indifference curves IC1(x) and IC2(x),
respectively, at point x. The planes hT1(x) and hT2(x) intersect
h∇(x) in the lines IS1(x) and IS2(x), respectively. Note that
given a line L(x) going through the point x, there are two (unit)
vectors from x along L(x) pointing to two opposite directions, de-
noted by L+(x) and L−(x).
We can now informally explain our solution to the problem of
searching for joint gains. When it isn’t possible to obtain a com-
promise direction for joint improvements at a point x ∈ Oc either
because the compromise vector points to the space outside of the
feasible setOc or because the two parties are in local strong oppo-
sition at x, we will consider to move along the indifference curve of
one party while trying to improve the utility of the other party. As
5Let S be the set of alternatives, x∗ is weakly Pareto optimal if
there is no x ∈ S such that ui(x) > ui(x∗) for all agents i.
the mediator does not know the indifference curves of the parties,
he has to use the tangent hyperplanes to the indifference curves of
the parties at point x. Note that the tangent hyperplane to a curve
is a useful approximation of the curve in the immediate vicinity of
the point of tangency, x.
We are now describing an iteration step to reach the next tentative
agreement xh+1 from the current tentative agreement xh ∈ Oc. A
vector v whose tail is xh is said to be bounded in Oc if ∃λ > 0
such that xh+λv ∈ Oc. To start, the mediator asks the negotiators
for their gradients∇u1(xh) and ∇u2(xh), respectively, at xh.
1. If xh is a Pareto-optimal outcome according to equation 2 or
equation 3, then the process is terminated.
2. If 1 ≥ ∇u1(xh).∇u2(xh) > 0 and the vector T BS(xh) is
bounded in Oc then the mediator chooses the compromise
improving direction d = T BS(xh) and apply the method
described by Ehtamo et al [4] to generate the next tentative
agreement xh+1.
3. Otherwise, among the four vectors ISσi (xh), i = 1, 2 and
σ = +/−, the mediator chooses the vector that (i) is bounded
in Oc, and (ii) is closest to the gradient of the other agent,
∇uj(xh)(j 	= i). Denote this vector by TG(xh). That is,
we will be searching for a point on the indifference curve of
agent i, ICi(xh), while trying to improve the utility of agent
j. Note that when xh is an interior point ofOc then the situa-
tion is symmetric for the two agents 1 and 2, and the mediator
has the choice of either finding a point on IC1(xh) to im-
prove the utility of agent 2, or finding a point on IC2(xh) to
improve the utility of agent 1. To decide on which choice to
make, the mediator has to compute the distribution of gains
throughout the whole process to avoid giving more gains to
one agent than to the other. Now, the point xh+1 to be gener-
ated lies somewhere on the intersection of ICi(xh) and the
hyperplane defined by ∇ui(xh) and TG(xh). This inter-
section is approximated by TG(xh). Thus, the sought af-
ter point xh+1 can be generated by first finding a point yh
along the direction of TG(xh) and then move from yh to the
same direction of∇ui(xh) until we intersect with ICi(xh).
Mathematically, let ζ and ξ denote the vectors TG(xh) and
∇ui(xh), respectively, xh+1 is the solution to the following
optimisation problem:
max
λ1,λ2∈L
uj(xh + λ1ζ + λ2ξ)
s.t. xh+λ1ζ+λ2ξ ∈ O
c, and ui(xh+λ1ζ+λ2ξ) = ui(xh),
where L is a suitable interval of positive real numbers; e.g.,
L = {λ|λ > 0}, or L = {λ|a < λ ≤ b}, 0 ≤ a < b.
Given an initial tentative agreement x0, the method described
above allows a sequence of tentative agreements x1,x2, . . . to be
iteratively generated. The iteration stops whenever a weakly Pareto
optimal agreement is reached.
THEOREM 3. If the sequence of agreements generated by the
above method is bounded then the method converges to a point
x
∗ ∈ Oc that is weakly Pareto optimal.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have established a framework for negotiation
that is based on MCDM theory for representing the agents’ objec-
tives and utilities. The focus of the paper is on integrative negotia-
tion in which agents aim to maximise joint gains, or “create value.”
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We have introduced a mediator into the negotiation in order to al-
low negotiators to disclose information about their utilities, with-
out providing this information to their opponents. Furthermore, the
mediator also works toward the goal of achieving fairness of the
negotiation outcome.
That is, the approach that we describe aims for both efficiency, in
the sense that it produces Pareto optimal outcomes (i.e. no aspect
can be improved for one of the parties without worsening the out-
come for another party), and also for fairness, which chooses op-
timal solutions which distribute gains amongst the agents in some
appropriate manner. We have developed a two step process for ad-
dressing the NP-hard problem of finding a solution for a set of in-
tegrative attributes, which is within the Pareto-optimal set for those
attributes. For simple attributes (i.e. those which have a finite set
of values) we use known optimisation techniques to find a Pareto-
optimal solution. In order to discourage agents from misrepresent-
ing their utilities to gain an advantage, we look for solutions that
are least vulnerable to manipulation. We have shown that as long
as one of the simple attributes does not strongly dominate the oth-
ers, then truth telling is an equilibrium strategy for the negotiators
during the stage of optimising simple attributes. For non-simple at-
tributes we propose a mechanism that provides stepwise improve-
ments to move the proposed solution in the direction of a Pareto-
optimal solution.
The approach presented in this paper is similar to the ideas be-
hind negotiation analysis [18]. Ehtamo et al [4] presents an ap-
proach to searching for joint gains in multi-party negotiations. The
relation of their approach to our approach is discussed in the pre-
ceding section. Lai et al [12] provide an alternative approach to
integrative negotiation. While their approach was clearly described
for the case of two-issue negotiations, the generalisation to negoti-
ations with more than two issues is not entirely clear.
Zhang et at [22] discuss the use of integrative negotiation in
agent organisations. They assume that agents are honest. Their
main result is an experiment showing that in some situations, agents’
cooperativeness may not bring the most benefits to the organisation
as a whole, while giving no explanation. Jonker et al [7] consider
an approach to multi-attribute negotiation without the use of a me-
diator. Thus, their approach can be considered a complement of
ours. Their experimental results show that agents can reach Pareto-
optimal outcomes using their approach.
The details of the approach have currently been shown only for
bilateral negotiation, and while we believe they are generalisable to
multiple negotiators, this work remains to be done. There is also
future work to be done in more fully characterising the outcomes
of the determination of values for the non-simple attributes. In or-
der to provide a complete framework we are also working on the
distributive phase using the mediator.
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